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INTRODUCTION: HIDDEN QUESTIONS OF PLURALISM
There are two interconnected questions obscured in the con-
temporary discourse of legal pluralism. The first concerns the legit-
imacy of the various forms of pluralism. The second concerns their
pathology. If we accept that law does not issue from a unitary source,
the problem becomes to characterize the kinds of pluralism in
which we find ourselves and to discern their principles of legiti-
macy. It cannot be taken for granted that they are all legitimate,
that is to say, that they can both articulate and fulfill founding prin-
ciples of justification. That leads to the second question. To cele-
brate all legal pluralism simply by drawing attention to it as an
observable, documented fact, without considering whether that
pluralism conduces to the just and the good, is like speaking of the
pluralism of the body’s mechanisms without asking whether any
given complex of cells is malignant or benign.
An authoritarian order, such as a business corporation, con-
tributes to and is as characterized by pluralism as much as a dem-
ocratic order. It has its implicit and explicit norms, its formal and
informal institutional settings. Its pluralism is no guarantee of any-
thing just or salutary. It is only a characteristic of the multiple and
overlapping settings in which we live out our lives and form our
identities. In the authoritarian order, those multiple settings can
include forms of dissent and resistance, and can go underground in
challenge to a dominant order that strives to contain them. 
In an ideal democratic order, by contrast, those multiple and
overlapping settings are acknowledged, with the ambition that they
become a source for the mutual renewal of ideas and identities.
Democracy, in its ideal form, aims at the freest expression of plu-
ralism, but a pluralism of a specific and salutary sort: a purposive
pluralism that is constructed with the aim of sharing burdens among
and joining the life projects of the citizens who constitute it. 
The cosmopolitan project aspires to a pluralism of legal orders
that can be brought into alignment by a citizen who succeeds in
mastering overlapping identities and civic responsibilities. But the
transition from national to cosmopolitan citizenship is fraught with
illegitimacy and pathology. The purpose of this paper is to explore
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that last claim. I begin (I) with a short interpretation of a locus
classicus: Kant’s notion of pathology in law, and cosmopolitanism.
I then explore (II) Jean-Guy Belley’s work concerning the pathol-
ogies of “synaptic democracy” and (III) Andrée Lajoie’s work con-
cerning anomie and post-modern value judgments to develop an
account of the transition from national to cosmopolitan citizen-
ship. Finally (IV) I sketch the pathologies of pluralism expressed in
seven vices corresponding to seven moments in the unfolding of
cosmopolitan citizenship. 
I. KANT ON PATHOLOGY
A. Kant’s Ambivalence About the Origins of Society 
In The Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan
Point of View, Kant defines the state as a “pathologically enforced
social union” due to the human “tendency to come together in soci-
ety, coupled, however, with a continual resistance which constantly
threatens to break this society up.”1 He further explains:2
Man has an inclination to live in society, since he feels in this
state more like a man, that is he feels able to develop his natu-
ral capacities. But he also has a great tendency to live as an
individual, to isolate himself, since he also encounters in him-
self the unsocial characteristics of wanting to direct everything
in accordance with his own ideas.
Our “social unsociability” poises us on the edge of virtue and
vice, pathological conflict and lawful order. The encounter with
others shakes us from a disposition to indolence, but awakens van-
ity, lust for power and greed. These passions in turn develop our
talents and give rise to judgments of social worth. According to
Kant, such judgments settle into practical principles and norms
that can transform what begins as “heartless, competitive vanity”
into a society that can be viewed as a “moral whole.” It becomes a
1 “The Idea of Universal History” in Political Writings (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1991) at 44.
2 Ibid. 
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moral whole when it is lawful, that is, when the vying among indi-
viduals to impose their separate wills is organized around norms.
One can say, therefore, that for Kant the transition to legitimacy
contains both pathology and a tension between pluralism and unity.
The pathology originates in the passions that animate sociability.
The tension between pluralism and unity originates in the antag-
onism between individual wills and social constraint.
Out of this sketch of the origins of law, Kant develops the thesis
that the greatest problem facing humanity, the solution to which
we are in a sense driven by our social unsociability, is the achieve-
ment of a lawful and plural civil society—a cosmopolitan order.
Absent a solution to this problem, we will remain in a situation of
war, strife and deprivation. 
The giddy prospect Kant explores, tentatively and ironically, is
that of interpreting history as imbued with the purpose of finding a
solution to this problem. He does not, however, imagine the inex-
orable and triumphant march of reason toward a cosmopolitan
order. He imagines a future that may include “a hell of evils, how-
ever civilized we may now be.”3 Though purposive, history’s path
meanders. As Kant puts it in his famous pre-Wilsonian dictum:4
Through war, through the taxing and never-ending accumula-
tion of armament, through the want, which any state even in
peacetime, must suffer internally, Nature forces [humanity] to
make at first inadequate and tentative attempts; finally after
devastations, revolutions and even complete exhaustion, she
brings them to that which reason could have told them in the
beginning and with far less sad experience, to wit, to step from
the lawless condition of savages into a league of nations.
Kant does not imagine the emergence of a lawful cosmopolitan
civil society as forever overcoming the pathologies of an enforced
legal order. Nor does he imagine that a cosmopolitan civil society
will take shape within a unitary state. Rather, he imagines the grad-
3 KANT, “Idea for a universal history from a cosmopolitan point of view”,
Lewis WHITE BECK tr. in On History (New York: Macmillan, 1963).
4 Ibid. 
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ual emergence of cosmopolitan citizenship out of the interplay of
salutary and pathological legal orders. What conduces to cosmo-
politan citizenship is salutary. What deflects from it is pathological.
Insofar as particular legal orders are conceived and enforced to
exclude potentially legitimate members, they are necessarily path-
ological, producing social ambivalence and conflict. Over time,
through conflict and accommodation, social unions evolve to become
less exclusive and to give greater scope for freedom of identity and
allegiance; that is, they come to accept and acknowledge internal
pluralism, leading in time to an increasingly propitious context for
cosmopolitan citizenship and indeed for a cosmopolitan constitu-
tionalism.
B. Citizen and Body Politic
Kant moves seamlessly from an account of salutary and path-
ological individual behaviour to the discussion of salutary and path-
ological legal orders. He seems to elide individual virtue and vice
with civic virtue and vice. But why are the virtues and vices of indi-
viduals the same as the virtues and vices of the body politic? Is
there here an implicit personification of legal orders? Does that in
turn set the stage for the conclusion that cosmopolitan citizenship
will be found in the mediation between legal orders rather than in
direct participation in self-government?
What links the citizen and the legal order in Kant’s account is a
theory of human perfectibility. The legal order is the repository of
our collective learning and experience. For example, when our social
unsociability eventually produces reliable patterns of contracting,
it is not requisite for each generation to re-elaborate and re-establish
these patterns. The legal “tradition,” not a term Kant uses, provides
the baseline against which the social unsociability of each subse-
quent generation is played out.5 Indeed, if the tradition accentu-
ates unsociability, this can sometimes lead to its own destruction.
Nevertheless, by shaping our contexts of choice, providing the hori-
zon within which individuals form their plans and ambitions, the
5 See Ernest SHILS, “Tradition and Liberty” in The Virtue of Civility (Indiana-
polis: Liberty Fund, 1997).
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legal order is partly constitutive of the self. At the same time, the
choices each individual makes to engage or to disengage, to build
upon or to separate herself from a legal order become partly con-
stitutive of that legal order. There is thus a reflexive, mutually con-
stitutive, relationship between law and citizenship. Kant offers a
reading of history that would posit purposiveness to nature in the
sense that all natural capacities evolve toward their natural end.
Thus, the reflexive relationship between law and citizens could be
read as tending toward individual and civic virtues. But Kant pur-
ports to give no demonstration that this redemptive reading is indeed
borne out history. To the contrary, he plants seeds of scepticism
when he castigates European claims to civilization.
II. SYNAPTIC DEMOCRACY
That there is a reflexivity of law and citizenship need not lead
to the conclusion that the virtues of a legal order are the same as
the virtues of citizenship. A good legal order is not simply the aggre-
gate expression of what it means for each to be a good citizen. Thus,
a particular legal order, for example that within a university, will
display its virtues in accordance with the purpose of the relation-
ships forged in that community. A good citizen of a university will
both be shaped by that community and participate in the pursuit of
its goals. But that same good citizen will be engaged by other legal
orders and thus, for that individual, the meaning of good citizen-
ship will be found in the integration of multiple roles and respon-
sibilities. Accumulating and finding integrity within multiple roles
and responsibilities presents a challenge for the individual citizen,
one of inter-normativity, that is not precisely parallel to the chal-
lenge of inter-normativity faced by legal orders. 
For example, a university community can measure itself against
its capacity to pursue its own ends for their own sake, taking account
of other legal orders only to the degree necessary for its own pur-
poses. Indeed, for it to pursue ends other than its own, such as those
of a business corporation or those of a government, is to undermine
its meaning as a community and to weaken the possibility of good
citizenship within it. The same might be said for a business corpo-
ration or government attempting to cast itself as a university or
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something other than it is. The integrity and legitimacy of a legal
order could be characterized as reposing on its ability to identify
and reproduce a discrete set of ends.
In contrast, the citizen must be able to act with integrity in
multiple legal orders. The legitimacy of citizenship lies not in pur-
suing a discrete set of ends with integrity, but in pursuing overlap-
ping and competing ends with integrity. Citizenship within plural
legal orders entails a heuristic of self-legislated justice: giving to
each part of oneself its due. What is “due” in the sense of what com-
mands priority, and brings us to devote time, is one inter-normative
dimension of justice for the citizen. What is “due” in the sense of
what calls us to account to show care and concern is another dimen-
sion. What is “due” in the sense of what is needful in the circum-
stances and brings us to exercise judgment, is a third dimension.
The legitimacy of citizenship within plural legal orders requires
the alignment of time, care and judgment so as to issue in a form of
self-legislated justice. 
Each legal order both conduces to and deflects from the self-
legislated justice of the individual citizen. Being a citizen of the
university provides the occasion for the investment of time, care
and judgment. But because membership in that community involves
the exclusive pursuit of a discrete set of ends, the individual’s self-
legislated justice can be bent out of shape to those ends. Indeed,
the exemplary citizen of the university may be that individual for
whom time, care and judgment are entirely devoted to the single
community. The inter-normativity of justice and virtue of a citizen
is in tension with the singularity of justice and virtue of the legal
order. This upends notions of the singularity of the self in contrast
to the inter-normativity of the community. Hybrid legal orders that
attempt to conciliate multiple ends—the socially responsible cor-
poration, for example—can be understood as openly acknowledg-
ing the inter-normativity of the actors that form them.
The construction and pursuit of cosmopolitan citizenship
entails a multiplicity to the citizen-self because it entails the gov-
ernance of multiple legal orders. Cosmopolitan citizenship is not
premised upon the construction of a legal order for a single commu-
nity that can rank and align all purposes pursued within it. Rather,
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it is premised upon the nesting and overlapping of a multiplicity of
communities each pursuing their separate ends and operating in a
partially reflexive relationship with a shifting pool of citizens.
Consider the contrast with the idealized Greek polis. There it
was possible to imagine a city constituted exclusively by a stable
pool of citizen-kinsmen. Each of the practical arts, each commer-
cial venture, each form of pedagogy, each display of poetry, indeed
each form of conflict, was in principle bent to the purposes of the
city. For a form of pluralism to emerge in the academy was an inher-
ent corruption of the youth, who might devote their time, care and
judgment to it rather than to the city. The academy could only sur-
vive if it showed that its purposes were subordinate to those of the
city and if it made no claim to the pursuit of ends that were dis-
tinctly valuable in themselves. The laws were understood to issue
from an understanding of the proper alignment of all purposes to
be pursued by all citizens. Thus, non-citizens could only have instru-
mental value for citizens. Pluralism and inter-normativity were
addressed either through hierarchy—which subsumes multiple
orders by ranking them—or through opposition—which excludes
multiple orders by creating zones of conflict.
Cosmopolitan citizenship eschews such hierarchy and seeks
to substitute overlapping consensus for opposition. Jean-Guy Belley
has described the form of legal order within which cosmopolitan
citizenship is exercised as a “synaptic democracy.”6 His term trades
on the metaphor of neural functioning in the brain. I understand
him to mean that each legal order is like a synapse responding to its
own set of stimuli and governed according to its own purpose. Syn-
apses are coordinated and respond to each other. They are reflexive,
and together they govern the functioning—at least the move-
ment—of a single organism. But the participation of individual cells
in governance happens within the specialized role of the synapse
rather than indiscriminately for all of the body. In “synaptic democ-
racy,” individual citizens can only participate in self-governance
6 Jean-Guy BELLEY, “Gouvernance et démocratie dans la société neuronale”,
in Cardinal L. & Andrew C., ed. La démocratie à l’épreuve de la gouvernance
(Ottawa: Les Presses de l’Université d’Ottawa, 2001) at 153-171.
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through particular “synaptic” legal orders and cannot engage the
governance of the cosmopolitan body politic.
Before discussing Belley’s argument that synaptic democracy
can lead to dysfunctional—pathological—individuals, some obser-
vations about his metaphor are in order. The metaphor is arguably
more apt for a Greek polis or a unitary state than for contemporary
cosmopolitan citizenship. The synapse has its prescribed place
within the functioning of the brain, which in turn governs the body.
The famous illustration of the Leviathan taken from the second
edition of Hobbes’s work shows a citizenry that forms a body sur-
mounted by the head of the King. If the citizens can decapitate this
head and substitute themselves, but nevertheless form a single
Leviathan, everyone can be ranked through offices and lines of
authority—often called the “organs” of government. While there
can be some residual internal shifting and renewal of the function
of citizen-cells, at any particular time each takes its place within
the whole. What is organic is hierarchical and must absorb, resist
or exclude what is foreign. 
On closer inspection it might be said that cells forming syn-
apses have semi-permeable membranes that both respond to a
wide variety of stimuli originating throughout the body and them-
selves produce biochemical agents that to a greater and lesser degree
operate throughout the body. As located and role-specific as each
cell is, it not only forms part of the whole, but also influences, more
or less directly, the functioning of every other cell. The reflexivities
of the cell, the synapse, the nerve, and the nervous system are
overlapping yet discrete. We can understand a great deal about the
functioning of smaller body systems by seeing them as components
of larger body systems. But we would not understand the organic
character of the body by characterizing it only as a series of auto-
poetic systems and subsystems. What is organic is both discrete
and permeable.
Discreteness and permeability serve to make the organic met-
aphor one of continuing saliency for jurists attempting characterize
legal orders. That metaphor in turn permits the recurrent person-
ification of law. Law’s personification in the body politic, in legal
personality and legal persons, in incorporation and corporeal and
30-Lajoie.book  Page 566  Mardi, 20. mai 2008  12:26 12
567
COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP AND PATHOLOGIES OF PLURALISM
incorporeal property—indeed in property itself remains an appar-
ently irresistible though misleading figure of speech. The body pol-
itic is not a body. Legal persons are not persons. Corporations have
no corpus. Property is not proper to me. 
Yet there is an echo of the person in the legal person, of the cor-
pus in the incorporation and of my properties in property. Perhaps
this is the coming into being of a body generated by others.7 That
is, if others author my own being, and if I can author other beings,
I can conceive of a world entirely ordered through authored beings,
or at least find intimations of such a world. In this sense law, and its
plethora of personifications, emerges from an irresistible, indeed
an erotic, creative property of the created self. It might be stated
thus: I am part of a chain of being that must make my own chain of
being. My own chain of being is my part of creation. It brings forth
persons out of the passions, orders out of chaos. It is my lawmak-
ing. Since it is part of a chain of being, to call law my own creation,
my property, as if it emerged like Athena from the head of Zeus,
imbues the fallacy that law always already is with the aesthetic
quality on which its legitimacy ultimately depends. 
Law is willed and made but it is also received and represented.
It is an effort not only to project a creative will but also to call forth
and to receive what I can know and understand. It speaks in affir-
mations and certitudes. But it acts in approximations and revisions.
Metaphor is apt to the language of the law since it preserves the
dual sense of creation and reception, revolution and tradition. We
cast the law as personification through a creative act of will. Yet we
set about discovering the properties of our creation seeking out
what is proper to ourselves and thus receiving and representing a
prior creation. I believe it is more than a play on words that we
declare the created properties of ourselves to be goods.
Thus, I read a legal metaphor like synaptic democracy as an
amalgam of creation and representation. It purports to be not only
a novel reconstruction of legal orders but also a property of those
legal orders, which can be explored and represented. What is for
7 See George STEINER, Grammars of Creation (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 2001).
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Jean-Guy Belley the “givenness” of synaptic democracy is imbued
with both senses. To recast democracy as synaptic is both to recon-
struct it, even to transform it, and to represent a deeper or better or
newer understanding of law’s ancient corporeal leitmotif. Hobbes
could not have spoken of synapses although he did speak of democ-
racy and the body politic. 
III. FROM NATIONAL TO COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP
A. Synaptic Democracy and Cosmopolitan Citizenship
Jean-Guy Belley’s synaptic democracy follows in a tradition of
modesty of expectations about the democratic project. The mod-
esty of synaptic democracy is this: we can only govern ourselves in
a small subsection of the cosmopolitan body politic and even there
we can only do so reflexively, in response to outside stimuli not
within our control. Indeed, if the metaphor is pushed to its limit,
our reflexive responses as citizens of a synaptic democracy would
not truly be self-government. Rather, they would amount to conduct
required of us in fulfilling our function within the whole polity. The
modesty of this understanding can be restated: within synaptic
democracy, self-government consists in recognizing and acknowl-
edging the role we are called upon to play within the whole. Thus,
the characteristic form of contemporary democracy emerges in
the identification of the limited set of tasks that can be performed
within restricted resources, taking account of the tasks performed
by and resources available to other instances of government.
The modesty of such a democratic project corresponds to mod-
esty about the role of citizens. If citizenship involves participation
in self-government, synaptic democracy can allow only part of cit-
izenship to be exercised within any legal order, since no single legal
order can be self-governing. Cosmopolitan citizens are thus con-
demned either to the disaffection that accompanies incompleteness
or to the pyrrhic task of negotiating and reproducing legitimacy
simultaneously in multiple legal orders. When Jean-Guy Belley
speaks of the cosmopolitan citizen who can become a dysfunctional
individual, he has in mind the first of these two possibilities, although
both are pathogenic. Belley’s dysfunctional individual refuses to
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acknowledge the challenge for identity that pluralism poses for
cosmopolitan citizenship. She retreats to the particular legal order
closest to her concerns and, having experienced the inability to
participate in full citizenship there, ultimately retreats from citi-
zenship altogether.
B. Anomie and Post-Modern Value Judgments
Andrée Lajoie detects the same dysfunction of citizenship as
does Belley but imagines a kind of cure: judicial value judgments
that seek overlapping consensus between majorities and minori-
ties. According to Lajoie, contemporary societies have abandoned
not only the possibility of consensus but even the possibility of sta-
ble self-reproducing majorities.8 Given a society made up of a var-
ying and variable pluralism of ideologies and allegiances, Lajoie
asks whether the idea of modernity—which she identifies with the
aspiration for democratic consensus—has given way to social
anomie and law’s complete indeterminacy. The reference to anomie
ties quite precisely to considerations of civic pathology and dys-
function, since for Durkheim, the absence of norms—a-nomos—
could produce such social disorganization and disorientation as to
lead even to what he called le suicide anomique.9 Post-modernity
arguably produces a redoubling of anomie since not only does it
serve to dislocate traditional social order—as modernity had done
before it—but instead of substituting a new set of norms toward
which anomic citizens could gravitate, on Lajoie’s account it offers
only normative indeterminacy. 
Nevertheless, Lajoie’s conclusion about contemporary anomie
is disarmingly coy: “Feu la modernité? Viennent l’anomie sociale
généralisée et l’indétermination totale du droit? Ce n’est pas si
clair.”10 The burden of her argument is that in constitutional deci-
sion-making judges will decide within a wide range of normative
indeterminacy attempting to arbitrate among minority and major-
8 Andrée LAJOIE, Jugements de valeurs (Paris: PUF, 1997) at 207.
9 Émile DURKHEIM, Le suicide : étude de sociologies (Paris: PUF, 1973).
10 Andrée LAJOIE, supra note 8 at 207.
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ity values but nevertheless staying within boundaries delimited by
the interests of the majority. She goes so far as to suggest that it is
precisely because normative pluralism has given rise to a legiti-
macy deficit of formal legislative institutions, which can no longer
claim a monopoly on adherence, that the judiciary has emerged to
fill the vacuum.11 The judiciary, she argues, is not constrained to
pay homage to a fleeting electoral majority. It can go about the task
of carefully refashioning social values in quest of an elusive over-
lapping social consensus. Indeed, according to Lajoie’s character-
ization of post-modernity, the judge is no longer discerning and
applying majority values, but attempting to posit values that could
become those of a majority. Such a role for the judiciary is, she
claims, essential if a post-modern state is to survive. 
But Lajoie’s last word on whether the judiciary could succeed
in this task is to say the least ambivalent. Her final assertion is that
the interests of the majority have become indefinable. Thus how
can the judiciary successfully identify an overlapping consensus of
values if there is no such thing as a majority to anchor it around?
And how can judges overcome anomie if their task has become to
articulate values that are always at some distance from those of
any particular social group and indeed if they proceed on the
assumption that there is no fixed, stable delimitation of social
groups and values within which to work? If their role is conceived
this way, are they not, rather, agents of anomie and the embodiment
of its presence in the heart of institutions that had been conceived
as norm-reproducing? 
There is yet another dimension to this dilemma. In seeking to
fashion some kind of overlapping consensus, the judge will presume
that those who are seeking a judicial pronouncement on values will
accept and live by the adjudicated outcome and that they stand in
for wider social strata that will do the same. Judicial deliberation is
thus conceived to take place within an ideal communicative set-
ting that can contain all discourse about values. But judicial delib-
eration is itself but one setting within which value judgments are
made and it has only a modest steering capacity with respect to the
11 Ibid, at 209-10.
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synaptically connected sets of legal orders through which citizens
navigate. Judicial overruling of anomie by fiat is thus an illusory
notion. At best, judges could view themselves as helping to stabilize
a possible hypertrophy of pluralism by drawing from and contribut-
ing to the reflexive inter-normativity of fragmented legal orders. 
Lajoie’s intuition is that there is much more normative stabil-
ity than the notion of generalized anomie would suggest. But this
impression may have to do with the proportion of citizens who
embrace the loosening of normative moorings as emancipatory or
who discover within legal orders that are partly constitutive of their
lives (the workplace, the family, religion, etc.) strong supervening
conventional ties substituting for the nation-state. That is to say
that the roots of anomie in normative instability may in fact be
present but subject to more or less successful adaptive strategies.
Indeed, Lajoie’s work on aboriginal governance investigates commu-
nities for which adaptation to anomie is in various states of insta-
bility.
The question therefore becomes not simply whether judicial
value judgments can provide a buffer against social anomie, but
whether the disorientation and instability associated with the tran-
sition from national to cosmopolitan citizenship will produce a
greater aggregate of dysfunction or emancipation. The answer to
this question requires a preliminary account of citizenship itself.
Thus far, this discussion has been trading on the notion of partic-
ipation in self-government.12 In another paper, Dann Downes and
I distinguished among seven dimensions of citizenship that we iden-
tified using canonical accounts within the Western tradition:13
(1) to exemplify civic virtue (the Athenian in Plato’s Laws) 
(2) to participate in the exercise of offices (Aristotle) 
(3) to be the equal subject of the laws (St. Paul; Gaius) 
(4a) to unite in a common will to make a sovereign (Hobbes)
12 Rousseau, Du contrat social, chapitre 1.8.
13 The Problem of Cosmopolitan Citizenship (with Dann Downes) unpublished
manuscript.
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(4b) to consent to the making of the laws in return for rights (Locke)
(5) to engage a common cultural identity (Rousseau; Montesquieu) 
(6) to accord hospitality and comity to strangers (Kant) 
(7) to ensure social welfare (Marshall) 
C. Seven Moments in the Unfolding of the Citizen-Self
The seven dimensions of citizenship suggest seven moments in
the unfolding of the self to which they correspond. These moments,
although they relate to the stages in the unfolding of our lives, are
intertwined throughout our lives. Citizenship corresponds to these
moments of self-hood as they are lived out in the polity.14 The tran-
sition from national citizenship—here understood as an exclusive,
singular public identity—to cosmopolitan citizenship—here under-
stood as a plural, universal public identity—is lived out in each of
these moments.
The first moment in the unfolding of the self comes in being
born and having identity bestowed. The national citizen-self receives
the identity of citizenship at birth or by the re-creation of birth
through naturalization. In the Contrat social, Rousseau speaks of
the most important form of law15
qui ne se grave ni sur le marbre, ni sur l’airain, mais dans les
cœurs des citoyens; qui se fait la véritable constitution de
l’État; qui prend tous les jours de nouvelles forces; qui, lorsque
les autres lois vieillissent ou s’éteignent, les ranime ou les sup-
plée, conserve un peuple dans l’esprit de son institution, et
substitue insensiblement la force de l’habitude à celle de l’au-
torité. Je parle des mœurs, des coutumes, et surtout de l’opi-
nion; partie inconnue à nos politiques, mais de laquelle dépend
le succès de toutes les autres; partie dont le grand législateur
14 A parallel, though not entirely congruent discussion is found in Northrop
FRYE, The Great Code (Toronto: Academic Press, 1982) at 106-138.
15 Du contrat social, chapitre 2.12. Note the lovely play on the idea of divine
legislation which, for example as Torah, may secretly form the spirit of a
people while it appears to concern itself with particular edicts. 
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s’occupe en secret, tandis qu’il paraît à se borner à des règle-
ments particuliers, qui ne sont que le cintre de la voûte, dont les
mœurs, plus lentes à naître, forment enfin l’inébranlable clef.
Echoing Montesquieu’s account of the spirit of the laws, Rous-
seau innovates by ascribing custom, manner and tradition to the
heart of citizenship and to the identity born of the laws.16 The cos-
mopolitan citizen-self is adopted by the wide family of customs,
manners and traditions and reconceives identity as having its ori-
gin in their unity. For the national and cosmopolitan citizen-self alike,
the absence of customs, manners and traditions would empty citi-
zenship of its affinities and allegiances, thus emptying it of its affec-
tive core.
The second moment of the unfolding of the self comes in the
experience of authority through the acquisition of the capacity to
express identity. The national citizen-self earns capacity for expres-
sion by participating in the administration of justice and the exer-
cise of offices through which authority is wielded. For Aristotle,
this aspect of citizenship, even more than the experience of iden-
tity, forms the common core of the concept.17 Whereas some who
are born in a polity or are otherwise of a polity may participate in
citizenship only imperfectly (for example, not yet be of age, or be
past age), those who are eligible to participate in offices are univer-
sally understood to be citizens. For the ontogenesis of the cosmo-
politan citizen, however, this mode of expression is problematic
given the multiplicity of languages and the problem of translation.18
How can one speak with authority in many tongues? The national
citizen-self could in principle speak with authority in all offices.
The cosmopolitan citizen-self can learn to speak in the language of
others but relies upon others to be able to speak with authority in all
languages. Thus, in principle she will only fill that representative
16 Although see Plato’s Crito 51c.
17 Politics Book III, chapter 1 1275a.
18 See Rod MACDONALD, “Legal Bilingualism” (1997) 42 McGill Law Journal
119-167 and George STEINER, After Babel: Aspects of Language ans Trans-
lation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). The Jewish diaspora tied
to the universal city of Jerusalem produced the overlap of languages that
allowed for a cosmopolitan theological project: Acts 2:5. 
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portion of offices in which she can speak to and for the whole polity.
Just as the absence of the capacity for linguistic expression deprives
a self of its core, so too the absence of capacity to express one’s cit-
izenship through participation in offices deprives it of its core.
The third moment in the unfolding of the self comes in entering
into reciprocal relationships through which identity is tested and
refined. The national citizen-self forges a common will with her fel-
low citizens and consents to a compact governing the pursuit of
ends for that polity. The cosmopolitan citizen-self foregoes insist-
ence upon that original compact in the name of a cosmopolitan com-
pact that is in the process of being forged. Whereas Hobbes’s account
of the formation of the social contract emphasizes the submission
of all wills to a single will and denigrates the notion of consent,19
Locke’s account elevates the idea of consent, notably to majority
rule, and denigrates the idea of a single will.20 Hobbes thus high-
lights the emergence from the citizenry of a sovereign to impose a
single will, whereas Locke highlights the guarantees given to citi-
zens, especially the protection of property, in exchange for their
consent to government. Nevertheless, for both Hobbes and Locke,
the formation of a contract is at the core of citizenship because its
absence would leave individuals outside of political society, and
hence outside of the setting in which citizenship arises.
The fourth moment in the unfolding of the self comes in giv-
ing oneself to another and thus creating a common identity with
another. The national citizen-self engages the community of fellow
citizens in common projects. The cosmopolitan citizen-self affirms
the unknown of the other, with whom a life could be made together.21
19 Man and Citizen (Bernard Gert ed.), (Garden City, New York: Doubleday,
1972) chap. 5, at 168-9.
20 Second Treatise on Government, chapter 8, especially §98. Rousseau con-
nects the general will and consent. Locke speaks of subjects and members of
a commonwealth rather than of citizens under the sovereign, perhaps in
contrast with Hobbes’s usage.
21 On the contrast within citizenship between patriotic love and cosmopolitan
love, see Martha NUSSBAUM, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” in Martha
NUSSBAUM et al., For Love of Country? (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996) 2 and
Charles TAYLOR, “Why Democracy Needs Patriotism,” ibid. at 24. 
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In his discussion of cosmopolitan citizenship, Kant downplays the
possibility of generalized philanthropy.22 But he does insist on a
form of hospitality or neighbourliness necessary to establish cos-
mopolitan law. In law, this is called comity. Indeed, he rails against
the inhospitality of so-called civilized peoples who in visiting for-
eign countries and peoples have committed the most appalling
acts of exploitation—especially pressing others into slavery. To the
exploiters and colonizers, the only recognizable homeland was
their own and its extension outward through conquest was but a
manifestation of patriotism. The welcome reserved to a guest and
the other-regard shown to the host are for Kant the guarantors of
mutual respect and peaceful coexistence. Their absence removes
the ground of any possible cosmopolitan citizenship.23
The fifth moment in the unfolding of the self comes in remain-
ing faithful and true to the identity one has created with another.
The national citizen-self assumes the role of subject of the laws,
investing trust in the equal treatment the laws will accord and faith-
fully fulfilling the obligations the law imposes. The cosmopolitan
citizen-self remains faithful both to national laws and to the pros-
pect of cosmopolitan law. Thus, for example, St. Paul invoked his
status as citizen of Rome and subject of Roman laws in seeking fair
judgment against the accusations of the Sadducees and Pharisees.24
This invocation of Roman citizenship did not run counter to his
cosmopolitan mission or indeed to his understanding of the narrow
role of existing law.25 But Paul’s survival as a missionary depended
upon his jurist’s talent of exploiting the conflict of laws. The absence
of fidelity to and of Roman law, the absence of overlapping Roman
22 KANT, Principles of Lawful Politics (W. Schwartz tr.) (Scientia Verlag,
1988) at 83.
23 For a more elaborate discussion of hospitality, see Richard JANDA, “Toward
Cosmopolitan Law” (2005) 50 McGill L.J. 967-996.
24 Acts 25:12 as well as 16:37, 22:25 and 23:27. See discussion in Michael
WALZER, “Citizenship” in T. Ball et al. eds., Political Innovation and Con-
ceptual Change (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989) 211 at 214-
5.
25 Galations 2:19-21, 3:1-29. 
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and church citizenship, would have left Paul at the mercy of reli-
gious persecution and thus would have confined the Nazarene sect
to oblivion. More generally, the absence of trust in and of citizens
erases common identity and creates a vulnerability to exclusion
from citizenship.
The sixth moment in the unfolding of the self comes in seeking
to provide for the well-being of another. The national citizen-self
contributes to creating an identity with fellow-citizens that offers
goods for all. The cosmopolitan citizen-self aspires to sharing goods
with all the world’s peoples. T.H. Marshall writes of “the urge toward
a fuller measure of equality, an enrichment of the stuff of which the
status [of citizenship] is made.”26 His emphasis upon the relation-
ship between citizenship and social stratification echoes the ancient
and aristocratic conception intertwining citizenship and station.
Marshall himself observes that as late as the turn of the nineteenth
century, if not subsequently, social inequality was regarded as sal-
utary to the general welfare since it provided the greatest incentive
for labour. However, he claims that through the extension of par-
ticipation in offices and of the principle of equal application of the
laws, both already inherent in citizenship, the social stratification
of goods itself became susceptible to reconfiguration. While the
absence of social welfare does not entail the absence of citizenship,
the absence of its aspiration empties citizenship of purpose.
The seventh moment in the unfolding of the self comes in con-
fronting the finality of one’s own identity. The national citizen-self
perpetuates national citizenship by exemplifying civic virtues in
adherence to the laws. The cosmopolitan citizen-self inaugurates
cosmopolitan citizenship by accepting some sacrifice to complete
identification with a nation for the sake of a wider polity. In Plato’s
Laws, the Athenian insists that the highest form of good citizen-
ship cannot be ascribed to the person who is the best and most
loyal servant of the laws.27 In addition, the virtuous citizen must
26 T.H. MARSHALL, “Citizenship and Social Class” reproduced in Gershon
Shafir, ed., The Citizenship Debates: A Reader (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1998) 93 at 102.
27 PLATO, Laws, Book VII 822.
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acknowledge and act upon what the city’s founder had taught to be
praiseworthy while eschewing what had been taught to be blame-
worthy. The virtuous citizen can thereby help to teach the city
how to endure in a way that the laws alone cannot. The laws cannot
assign rules and proscriptions to the infinite variety of human cir-
cumstance and directly instruct about virtues and vices. But the
exemplification of virtues can provide a pattern or model to instruct
new citizens. Gandhi’s teachings, actions and sacrifice surely inau-
gurate contemporary cosmopolitan citizenship. The absence of such
exemplary citizenship would leave no inheritance to the polity.
These seven moments in the unfolding of the self and citizen-
self, captured by the ideas of identity, authority, reciprocity, alter-
ity, fidelity, well-being and duration, can be likened to the colour
spectrum. When visible light is diffracted, it is arranged into seven
distinct colours (violet, indigo, blue, green, yellow, orange, and red)
that shade continuously into one another and together compose
the spectrum. There are an infinite variety of combinations of
shades, but a fixed range of wavelengths within which the combi-
nations are established and distinct spectral colour manifested.
There are a number of useful ways in which the spectrum can be
described or characterized. While composed of seven distinct col-
ours, it can also be described as a range of colours from the blue to
red at the ends of the spectrum and thus divided between two
poles. A field of colour can be described using the four polar oppo-
sites of blue and red, light and dark. Colour is perceived by the eye
through the combination of three primary colours corresponding
to the function of neural receptors. It can also be characterized as
constituted through the interplay of hue, saturation and luminos-
ity that together prescribe its specific manifestations. By analogy,
the self can also be described as bounded by two poles (birth and
death), within a field of four polar opposites (birth/death, virtue/
vice), perceived through the interplay of three primary attributes
(as generated, as generative and as sustained), and constituted
through the interplay of three dimensions (freedom, being, time)
that together prescribe its specific manifestations. Similar analo-
gies could be drawn to the musical scale, in which the eighth note
is a reiteration of the first, and to the seven parts of speech (noun,
verb, adverb, adjective, preposition, conjunction, interjection—
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with pronoun, transitive or intransitive verb, and infinitive under-
stood as forms of other underlying parts of speech). A suggestive
table of these relationships is set out in an appendix to this paper. 
IV. PATHOLOGIES OF PLURALISM
A. From Cosmopolitan Citizenship to Pathogenic Pluralism
We can now examine with greater precision what it might mean
for an individual not to engage citizenship in general and cosmo-
politan citizenship in particular. Jean-Guy Belley postulates that
the individual called upon to function within a synaptic democ-
racy can become simultaneously overcharged by the task of nego-
tiating identity among many sites of normativity and stripped of
choice by the obligation to fulfill a predetermined set of tasks and
functions. Having less reflexive capacity than the artificial persons
within which she exercises citizenship, the individual may seek
refuge in forms of solipsism or ideology. Lajoie invokes the threat of
anomie. Anomic individuals become “dysfunctional,” losing auton-
omy and becoming both alienated and dysteleological.
The flight from citizenship is not strictly a contemporary phe-
nomenon associated with the surcharge of normative orders. The
stuff of classic drama is often found in the abandonment of citi-
zenship out of an unbearable tension between self and national
citizen-self. Consider Oedipus, fleeing the citizenship of his birth,
conceiving and fleeing that birth again. Consider Hermione in The
Winter’s Tale, torn between boundless grief for a lost child and the
public role of regal authority she must re-assume, cloistering her-
self in solitude. Consider Faust, seeking out youth and eschewing
his social rank to the point of bargaining away his soul. Consider
Aida and Radames, torn between birth and love, self-destructively
escaping their patriae. Consider Hamlet, having lost faith in the
King and Queen but unable to gain it in himself, repairing to the
conceit of folly. Consider Lear, torn between fading kingship and
growing progeny, withdrawing to the chasm on the heath. Consider
Antigone, torn between fidelity to the city and fidelity to the dead,
finding refuge in her prayers. Each abandonment of citizenship
asserts the trajectory of values of a prior, other self at the various
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moments of its unfolding. The “dysfunction” arises when that other
self wrestles with higher authority by seeking to remain inviolate
in her solitude or seclusion.
To attribute dysfunction to the individual is to miss the drama of
these stories. Nor can one simply attribute dysfunction to Oedipus’
Thebes, Hermione’s Sicily, Faust’s Wittenberg, Aida’s Ethiopa and
Radames’ Egypt, Hamlet’s Denmark, Lear’s Britain or Antigone’s
Thebes. The individual and her setting are antagonistic, impeding
each other from asserting authority. Misalignment of authority occurs
not only when the individual flees from citizenship, but also when
citizenship flees from the individual. The self-mastery and posses-
sion of the laws sought by Faust has its direct counterpoint in the
self-effacement through the laws of Joseph K. The resolution of all
these dramas would come with the alignment of authority in the
individual and her setting and the end of the reciprocal master-slave
relationship. The pathologies of national citizenship thus arise out
of impediments to the communion of the individual and the national
citizen.
The transition from national citizenship to cosmopolitan citi-
zenship involves detaching oneself from the exclusive hold of a pri-
mary community and reattaching oneself to and redefining oneself
through identification with the aesthetic of a universal community.28
Specific pathologies of pluralism arise from the impediments to this
transition. They consist in the features of the self, the nation, and
the cosmopolitan polity—as well as their interplay—that curtail
the coming into being of a sense of self that feels able autonomously
and legitimately to assert solutions to the ambivalences of multiple
justice claims. They can also be characterized as absences of con-
nection between the integrity of the individual and the cosmopol-
itan citizen.
Before outlining these pathologies, four preliminary observations
about the problems of transition to cosmopolitan citizenship are in
order. First, if the integrity of self and national citizen-self is fraught
28 See FRYE, supra note 14 at 130.
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with tension and drama, the further passage to cosmopolitan citizen-
ship at first appears inherently unbearable and self-destructive. To
abandon the ambition of free, unrestricted, self-definition through
a nation, which is an ambition to hegemony, and to subordinate
one’s community to a universal community seems to entail being
denuded of power and dignity.29 It appears that one is called upon
to become but a part of a synapse in the body politic and to forego
any aspiration of self-legislation and self-perfection—as illusory as
that aspiration was within the nation. 
Second, if convinced that one is foregoing self-legislation, one
can characterize the making of the laws, their poesis, as beyond any
individual power, imagination or responsibility and in this sense
self-contained; that is, law is characterized as auto-poetic.30 Such
a conception renders the very idea of citizenship obsolete, since
the process of law’s creation is severed from self-creation. Cosmo-
politan citizenship would be revealed as an empty simulacrum,
since our place within overlapping legal systems is to be acted upon
by the law rather than to be the agents of the law. On this view,
while legal systems may originally have been of our creation, in their
reflexivity they have taken on lives of their own and eclipsed their
makers. Cosmopolitan citizenship gives up the ghost to the machine.
Third, if cosmopolitan citizenship appears to involve a critical
abandonment of agency to law, one is compelled to reflect on the
relation between law’s pathology on the one hand and its creativity,
authority and legitimacy on the other. Do legal norms always emerge
as nemesis to pathology, like Athene at the end of the Oresteia?
Does law in this sense require a prior pathology, from which come
efforts to build community upon the overcoming of dysfunction?
Is the creative act of lawgiving itself a patho-logos, a speech about
the sources of suffering and dysfunction in the polity? Does its
authority derive from giving a definitive account of dysfunction?
29 Simone WEIL, (George Panichas ed.) The Simone Weil Reader (1977). See
also FRYE, supra note 14 at 100-101.
30 Niklas LUHMANN, Law as a Social System (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2004).
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Does its legitimacy depend upon its capacity to shed light on dys-
function and to guide away from it? 
Fourth and finally, it appears to be that the processes of change
in art, science and law—their historicities, if you will—operate dif-
ferently. Artistic expression exhibits a periodicity that takes on the
form of succeeding movements, schools, and meta-aesthetic pre-
suppositions often within the work of the artist over a lifetime. It is
all but impossible to characterize this periodicity as advancement
or progress. Rather, it reflects the successive efforts to imagine the
world anew and to give its unknown expression. Today’s institution-
ally affirmed art is yesterday’s unintelligible composition. Thus the
great artist redefines and re-conceives the boundaries of perception.
She lives out the liminal rationality of artistic expression. 
By contrast, unlike in the arts, the perfect and predictable repro-
duction of knowledge is taken to be a hallmark of scientific vitality.
The accepted markers of creativity in science denote advance-
ment and progress in which achievement builds upon achieve-
ment and the last word that is spoken is retained because it has yet
to be surpassed. Whereas a scientific revolution can dramatically
transform prior understandings of a field, it also functions to reorgan-
ize, reclassify and re-appropriate past achievements. Thus, the great
scientist extends and redefines the boundaries of perception. She
lives out the liminal rationality of advancement.
Historicity in law appears to function differently altogether. It
cannot be said that a transition to cosmopolitan citizenship resem-
bles the progress attributed to the natural sciences, nor the epiphanal
periodicity of artistic expression. There can be advance in legal
institutions in the sense that greater fitness for contemporary pur-
pose can be achieved through the evolution of legal categories,
sources, institutions, and norms. For example, one speaks of the
WTO as an advance on the former GATT framework since it has
achieved greater institutional capacity to manage the sets of rela-
tionships that arise in a contemporary global economy. Historicity
of law involves both an adjustment to and a reconstruction of a
composite of social change in general, including notably change in
technology and culture. Thus, legal change reflects that dimension
of human creativity that allows us to redefine social relationships
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through processes characterized by advances in learning and through
processes characterized by rebellion or counterpoint.31 I am thus
suggesting that legal creativity is a kind of second-order creativity
since it necessarily responds to other processes of creation or change
as they are manifested in social relationships. The jurist recognizes
and characterizes the contemporary social boundaries of percep-
tion. She lives out the liminal rationality of justesse. It is with this
in mind that the transition to cosmopolitan citizenship should be
considered.
B. Seven Moments of Pathology
This section will explore the pathologies of the transition to cos-
mopolitan citizenship using the famous typology: the seven deadly
sins. In somewhat stylized fashion I identify a characteristic sin or
pathology for each of the seven moments in the unfolding of the
cosmopolitan citizen-self, discussed earlier. Each of these pathol-
ogies can generate its own normativity, and can thus be a way in
which illegitimate pluralism is manifested.
1. Pathologies of Rejection (anger)
A transition from national to cosmopolitan citizenship involves
being freed from the grip of exclusive identity and embracing a form
of identity that is fluid and fashioned from many sources. This
transition can be experienced as becoming fragmented and inau-
thentic because it can be paradoxical. Both the confrontation with
pluralism from the standpoint of a largely exclusionary national or
religious identity, and the parallel insistence on pluralism and
accommodation of difference in the face of exclusive identity claims,
produce paradox. At one and the same time as implicitly or even
explicitly rejecting pluralism, the exclusionary identity will depend
on pluralism for its legitimacy by insisting that its voice be consid-
ered a protected right and afforded public space. At one and the
31 Patrick GLENN, Legal Traditions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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same time as proclaiming inclusion of exclusionary communities,
pluralism will be used to trump and defeat those exclusive claims. 
When the adherent to a religious faith relies on a pluralism that
she rejects, she will do so in anger. When the pluralist sets out to
exclude exclusionary claims, he can do so in anger as well. Anger is
the animus of rejection, directed against oneself or directed
against another. It is experienced as a violation of identity, menac-
ing the core of what one is. Hatred intensifies the personification of
that breach. The other that drew me into or made me aware of par-
adox is rejected and even subject to hatred. In the case of self-
hatred, my own failure to overcome paradox, my inability to tran-
scend my own divisions and countervailing tendencies, gives rise
to anxiety and auto-aggression.
Anger undermines the legitimacy of the evolution from national
to cosmopolitan citizenship, particularly as plural identities con-
dense around ambivalence and give rise to forms of rejection. This
overlapping convergence of mutually antagonizing identities is toxic.
It is a quagmire, because it provides no footing for a common set of
affirmations or civic exchange of opinion. Hatred directed against
the outsider must necessarily obscure her common identity as a
citizen. What could be shared in overlapping customs, manners and
traditions becomes instead what prevents affinity and allegiance. 
2. Pathologies of Disrespect (gluttony)
The expression of identity through the participation in offices
is directly engaged by the transition from national to cosmopolitan
citizenship. Old national institutions have their roles and respon-
sibilities challenged and sometimes absorbed by new transnational
or regional ones. Pathology arises when there is an over-reaching
in the exercise of civic functions, either as national institutions
attempt to expand their functions to transnational issues or as
transnational institutions seek to assume responsibility over mat-
ters for which they have yet to achieve competence. In both cases,
institutions fail to respect their jurisdiction and over-extend their
powers.
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For the individual cosmopolitan citizen who seeks to partici-
pate in offices across a range of normative orders, the failure to per-
form one’s myriad, at times overwhelming, responsibilities, and
perhaps more importantly an inability to see how the exercise of
those responsibilities produces some tangible good for diverse com-
munities, undermines self-respect. Over-arching values and the
self-image necessary to sustain them become implausible and non-
reproducible. This can produce a substitute and diversionary over-
investment in non-civic pursuits, which further saps the commit-
ment to the offices one should execute. Here is the dysfunctional
citizen described by Jean-Guy Belley. A lesser pathology arises where
the cosmopolitan citizen specializes her citizenship, becoming
informed and engaged about only a sliver of the public space.
A democratic deficit arises in transnational settings, not only
because institutions are insufficiently representative and afford
inadequate occasion to participate in offices, but also because tak-
ing up one’s responsibilities seems a Herculean task. Coming to the
town hall is one thing, engaging in deliberations about global gov-
ernance quite another. Just as the bread and circuses of an older
empire served to manufacture consent when meaningful republi-
canism had waned, so too the contemporary panoply of games and
spectacles, goods and services is ever more avidly consumed the
more elusive civic participation becomes. 
3. Pathologies of Imbalance (envy)
A compact of citizens requires reciprocity: the understanding
that each gives to and takes from the relationship. The transition to
a cosmopolitan compact in which power and obligation are asym-
metrically distributed can engender envy and resentment. This is
true not only for those with less power, although it may be felt by
them with greater virulence. It is also true of the citizens of an
imperial power who at times will envy those who do not bear the
burden of authority and conflict.
The dysfunctional cosmopolitan citizen will most envy that
perhaps fictional other who manages to achieve balance among all
the spheres of justice within which she functions. The dysfunc-
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tional citizen will always sense imbalance and always feel envy,
sometimes conjoined with shame. On the other hand, those for
whom citizenship remains circumscribed by nation or religion
might envy the cosmopolitan citizen, who moves in spheres that
are foreign to them. This is how it will appear if they cannot see
their identities as contributing to that of a cosmopolitan citizen
and affording to themselves a privileged means of exercising such
citizenship. If cosmopolitan citizenship is the preserve of a transit
lounge aristocracy for whom the masses are voiceless Helots, it will
be pregnant with envy.
A polity that enjoys an asymmetry of authority in global gov-
ernance, however democratic that polity may be, will also breed
envy. Even if it seeks to spread participatory citizenship elsewhere
and enters into compacts and agreements with whatever willing
partners it can find, its unequal power and influence can vitiate
reciprocity. If its citizens have a priority in the global order, and if
the global order is an instrument for the interests of its citizens,
cosmopolitan citizenship does not exist. The claimed porous and
overlapping character of sovereignty in a globalized world will be
revealed as a phenomenon for others and not for it. Even if it does
not seek to gain territory, it will be decried as an empire and rejected
as a partner. Envy will prevail over reciprocity. 
4. Pathologies of License (lust)
The hospitality necessary to build cosmopolitan bonds among
strangers can be abused by guest and host alike. The stranger who
takes advantage of hospitality can become a source of risk and
threat.32 The guest can take advantage of hospitality to act with
license to destroy the host, unencumbered by a feeling of common
identity. The host, master within her own domain, can act with
license to remove the threat, which, if the source of threat is indis-
cernible, can put an end to hospitality for any stranger. Similarly,
the host who abuses hospitality to exploit the guest will sense no
restrictions against letting passions run, particularly if the guest is
32 Ulrich BECK, La société du risque (Paris: Alto, 2001).
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already viewed as a threat. All passions are unleashed in a para-
doxical embrace of the threatening host or stranger as the one who
defines one’s own identity by incorporating difference.33 Where
the object of passion does not share a common identity, and so
becomes simply a thing or a prop for fantasy, passion turns to lust.34
For the dysfunctional cosmopolitan citizen, there are more
and less extreme ways in which the pathologies of license might be
manifested. One apparently benign but insidious way is to take
license with the other’s identity in the name of hospitality. This
might be called the sin of essentializing. One makes accommoda-
tion for the stranger knowing better than the stranger who the
stranger is and how she must behave. Attracted, even seduced, by
what is exotic in the other, one obliges the other to dance to one’s
own tune.35
A polity can no longer play host to strangers when “unknown
unknowns” are only threats and not occasions to learn about oth-
ers. If hospitality, or comity, loses its function in assuring cosmo-
politan self-control, a hell of passions can be unleashed. On the
other hand, comity can be onerous and restrictive of the host’s
freedom of action, particularly when it delays the response to per-
ceived threat. Thus, comity is also abused when those who insist
on it fail to account for threats to the host. Within the dynamic at
play between self-control and abuse lurks the temptation to take
pleasure in the exercise of power. Because comity involves vulner-
ability for domestic and foreign power alike, there is a temptation
to exploit the relationship so as to gain the upper hand and be free
in future to pursue one’s own will. Should such strategic behaviour
remain unchecked, it would expunge cosmopolitanism.
33 Carl Schmitt develops this theme in The Concept of the Political, trans.
George Schwab (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1976).
34 See Susan SONTAG, “Regarding the Torture of Others” New York Times
Magazine, May 23, 2004.
35 Robert BARSKY, in Arguing and Justifying, (Burlington: Ashgate, 2000),
discusses the refugee claims process as a matter of constructing the other to
meet one’s own image of what the refugee must be, which in turn obliges the
refugee to play that part, producing “abuse” of the refugee claims process.
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5. Pathologies of Arrogance (pride)
The history of cosmopolitanism is littered with millennial
projects.36 Indeed, to give expression to the idea of being a citizen
of the world may always be a form of pride or arrogance. Whereas
cosmopolitanism denotes global equality of status, to proclaim
that one has achieved cosmopolitan citizenship betokens superi-
ority and a completeness not achieved by others. Thus, for example,
the apparently embracive and descriptive concept of globalization
spawned a great divide between those for whom it was matter of
everyday experience, and those for whom it symbolized their own
marginalization. A particularly noxious form of arrogance arises
when one comes to believe that the national project is the cosmo-
politan project; that if only the rest of the world could become like
us, a new world order would be achieved. Here is pride overflowing.
Taking up the responsibilities of cosmopolitan citizenship
requires the utmost humility, since one can never truly be the amal-
gam of all identities, concerns and needs. But the individual must
have a measure of confidence so as to decide how to exercise the
offices that citizenship confers. In the face of a diversity one can-
not fully imagine, let alone comprehend, one will bluff understand-
ing, if only to advance toward a decision.37 Insofar as the bluff works,
and decisions are made, it is possible to believe in one’s own sub-
tlety and sophistication. Pride sets in.
It seems to be a constant of human affairs that sooner or later,
bluffs are called and pride is unmasked. Even those with the great-
est power run up against the limits of their capacity and foresight.
Believing they can act alone for the world—an anthropocentrism
that extends to the custody of Nature itself—they must eventually
call upon the world even to be able to secure their own national
interests. This might signal a return to equilibrium once hubris has
36 Armand MATTELART, Histoire de l’utopie planétaire (Paris: Éditions La
découverte, 1999).
37 Pierre BOURDIEU, La distinction: critique sociale du jugement (Paris: Les
Éditions de Minuit, 1979).
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been cut down to size. But then again, the defeated pride of one might
spur on the pride of another.
6. Pathologies of Acquisitiveness (greed)
Will it ever be possible to imagine that securing the welfare of
all is everyone’s obligation? The bonds of family and immediate com-
munity must remain stronger than the bonds of common human-
ity, and indeed it represents a breach of parental obligation to
prefer an unknown other to one’s own child. Yet, maintaining bar-
riers to the flow of capital between nations so as to ensure that
wealth continues to be accumulated by those who have it goes
beyond caring for one’s own: it displays greed. On the other hand,
the transnational corporate legal order, itself built on acquisitive-
ness, seeks to eliminate barriers to the flow of capital so as to exploit
the comparative disadvantages of impoverished labour. The assump-
tion that this can effect an improvement in welfare depends entirely
upon whether there is a sufficient saturation in labour supply to
prompt competition for labour among investors. Otherwise, once
one pool of labour has been picked clean, capital will shift to the
next.
The dysfunctional cosmopolitan citizen is tempted to address
social welfare by retreating to gated communities and leaving pov-
erty at the gate. Philanthropy can provide some tonic, yet even the
philanthropic individual who bestows more than tokens can rein-
force acquisitiveness. The choice of a charitable object will often
favour institutions from which one has derived real or imagined
benefit. And even if a gift is other-regarding, those others need not
be unknown others a world away. In the philanthropist’s heart, local
and national public goods will tend to trump global public goods.
The failure of states to finance global public goods is emblem-
atic of collective greed and impedes the emergence of a collective
polity, however loosely connected that polity may be38. Since by
definition part of the benefit of global public goods does not go to a
38 See Inge KAUL, Isabelle GRUNBERG and Marc STERN (eds.), Global Public
Goods (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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nation’s citizens, nations will tend to under-invest in them. Yet this
is self-defeating, since a nation will end up relying on the quality of
the global public good provided by others. Greed thus undermines
the collective action necessary to form a cosmopolitan community.
7. Pathologies of Neglect (sloth)
The great exemplars of cosmopolitan citizenship should inspire
us to emulate them and to redouble our own meagre efforts. But
their singular, larger than life, contributions can at times discour-
age even those who seek to fulfill their civic duties in good faith.
Such ordinary citizens may come to believe that anything short of
the heroic makes no difference. Or they may launch quixotic efforts
at cosmopolitan citizenship that are unarmed for the complexities
of acting within plural legal orders, and upon encountering defeat,
remain languid. 
There is a particular form of sloth that sets in for the dysfunc-
tional cosmopolitan citizen. Overwhelmed by the overlap of iden-
tities and endless range of potential responsibilities, she simply
fails to exert herself. She shows disinterest in all of the offices of cit-
izenship, having convinced herself that participation in any par-
ticular one is pointless. Thus she retreats completely into the
private sphere. She allows her citizenship to become virtual—sim-
ply a list of consumed services on offer by a range of suppliers.39
The state takes the heaviest toll of inaction because it will system-
atically fail to fulfill expectations of national citizenship, according
to which it should meet all needs and perform all services. Since it
is now but one of many legal orders working in a network of rela-
tionships, its citizens become baffled about how to take the meas-
ure of what it can provide.
The failure to rouse leadership in democracies and their con-
comitant failure to exemplify the cosmopolitan project is perhaps
the most corrosive of pluralism’s pathologies. Liberal pluralism
can fool itself into believing that what it proclaims is achieved by
39 Richard JANDA and Dann DOWNES, “Virtual Citizenship” (1998) 13 Can.
J. L. & Soc. 27.
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incantation rather than by vigilance and assiduity. The uncritical
exercise of authority has always been the indolent course. Democ-
racy has high transaction costs of consultation, participation, ac-
countability and planning. La pensée magique according to which
democracy will simply appear full blown if artificial obstacles to it
are cleared away is itself a form of sloth. It forgets the effort and
sacrifice of those who made democratic orders possible. An insouci-
ant democracy allows itself to be captured by pluralism’s patholo-
gies. If the virtues of democratic citizenship take on a resoundingly
hollow ring, no one will answer the call to fulfill civic duties.
CONCLUSION
Cosmopolitan citizenship is neither inherently virtuous nor
inherently pathogenic.40 But it is inaccurate to conclude that vir-
tue and vice are simply features of individual human motivation
and thus that the settings in which citizenship is exercised are
morally neutral. For example, a democracy that practices slavery,
however virtuous its citizens may be, has a vice rooted in its legal
personality. Indeed, civic virtue requires uprooting that vice from
the polity. Thus, the exercise of civic virtue can draw upon and cre-
ate legitimacy. But pathological, illegitimate legal orders can eclipse
civic virtue.
Each of the pathologies of pluralism catalogued here are fully
on display in contemporary law and politics. Each of the plural
legal orders within which cosmopolitan citizenship is exercised
strays toward illegitimacy. Ours is a pluralism in which exclusion-
ary religious and ideological claims can leave no place for the truth
claims and insights gained from other faiths. Ours is a pluralism in
which nation-states can fail to elicit the democratic participation
they claim to exemplify. Ours is a pluralism in which the commu-
nity of nations can tend toward hegemonic authority rather than
toward the balance of powers. Ours is a pluralism in which racially
profiled strangers can be treated as a source of unimaginable dan-
40 Jürgen HABERMAS, The Postnational Constellation trans. Max Pensky
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001).
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ger deserving unthinkable treatment. Ours is a pluralism in which
those bluffing the knowledge and capacity to manage global affairs
can act without their bluff being called. Ours is a pluralism in which
corporate citizens unconfined by democratic accountability even
to their shareholders can understand themselves to have limitless
claims upon wealth. Ours is a pluralism in which simulacra of cit-
izenship can hollow out any critical or emancipatory core to cos-
mopolitan citizenship.
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